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DNA, Masterpieces, and Abortion: Shifting the Grounds of the Debate​[1]​
"What a piece of work is a man! How noble in reason! How infinite in faculty! 
. . . in apprehension how like a god!"  Hamlet

"And God created man in His own image”  Genesis 1:27

Abstract

Writers, philosophers, and theologians have oft made the comparison between being a mature human being and a masterpiece work of art or design.  Employing the analogy between the creation of artistic value and the creation of full-fledged human value, this paper stakes out a middle ground between pro-choice and pro-life by considering a more general account of value and the relationship between being a potential X and a mature implementation of X's potential.  I argue that the value of a potential X is a function of a number of factors, most importantly, what I call the "accessibility relation" between a potential X and a full-fledged instantiation of this potential.  The value is as much intrinsic to the “seed” as to some future implementation of the seed’s potential.  This approach inclines even a secular humanist to reasonably confer a significant degree of moral value to a human conceptus, and even more to an early term fetus. 

The abortion issue tears at the moral intuitions of most reflective people.  On one hand the decision to abort is clearly more serious and morally complicated than a decision to intentionally kill a finger cell – a kind of “human life;” yet, overwhelmingly, men and woman involved in abortion decisions do not take the matter so lightly, despite the pro-choice claim that a conceptus​[2]​ or potential person has no significant intrinsic human value.  On the other hand, most anti-choice proponents​[3]​ do not themselves regard abortion as the moral equivalent of infanticide or outright murder:  despite their rhetoric and the logical implications of their position, most are not prepared to attach the same legal penalties or moral gravity to early-term abortion versus infanticide.  Is anyone prepared to make rape or incest a legal excuse for post-birth infanticide of a normal, healthy baby?  The literature fails to adequately square these fundamental moral intuitions.  Most pro-choice scholars​[4]​ argue against placing any significant intrinsic moral value on potential personhood per se, regulating any parental concerns over particular early abortions to extrinsic moral issues dealing with emotions, lifestyle choices, and both personal as well as community-wide network relationships among real people.  

As a theoretical matter, one can take each of the above positions and complicate it in order to deal with its problems. I am not so much concerned with definitely defeating one view or the other (whatever that means in philosophical terms).  Rather, in this paper I will propose an essentially different view of the moral status of a fetus or conceptus that both resolves the above conflicting moral intuitions and reframes the potentiality argument.  I offer a compromise position, which, I suggest, is pragmatically more useful, conceptually more elegant, and more fruitful than the conventional positions – the standard for choosing among competing theories in both science and philosophy.  In the end, my position is pro-choice, but respects the crucial anti-choice plank of awarding significant moral status to a conceptus, or potential person.  

The purpose of this paper is political as well as philosophical.  I will argue that the anti-choicer, without appeal to religious faith or doctrine, can meet the burden of the pro-choice argument denying moral value to a human zygote.  However, I hope to show that the burden of argument is on the pro-choicer as much as on the pro-lifer.  The typical, dismissive pro-choice mindset is unwarranted.  By discovering common moral ground, my aim is to encourage mutual respect and lower the rancor of the public debate.

What’s new:  While I agree that potentiality per se does not confer moral standing or value, I offer a general account of how in particular contexts potentiality can confer significant value to a potential X, where a full-fledged X has a recognized substantial value.  I suggest that the case of abortion is such a context.  I also outline a stance in which unifies moral and aesthetic value as relates to moral standing or status.  

The value of potential persons – the pro-choice position

The most persuasive pro-choice stance takes the position that a conceptus or an early term fetus is, at best, a potential person possessing little or no degree of personhood.  Since degree of personhood is deemed the only significant moral criterion determining the intrinsic moral standing of a life, it follows on this view that it is conceptually impossible to “murder” a life without personhood, such as a plant or finger cell – mere potential personhood is not sufficient to confer any significant degree of moral standing.  Hence on this view, early-term abortion can never be morally equivalent to murder – the intentional, wrongful killing of a person.   

For example, suppose a machine existed that could gradually grow healthy, full-fledged human beings from human finger cells, making every finger cell a potential person.​[5]​  The mere existence of such a device should not make pricking my finger with a pin a case of homicide, on the grounds that now my finger cells are potential people.  Surely killing a cell, even a second after the machine process begins, could not be murder – even though were we to leave the setup alone, and not interfere, a person would develop over several months.  Would we really want to lock up or condemn a person for murder just because the machine managed to rearrange a few molecules in the initial few seconds of operation?  If not, being a mere potential person is not morally significant.  At the very least, these considerations put the burden on the pro-lifer to demonstrate there is a morally relevant difference between killing a conceptus and sticking a needle in one’s finger, where those cells can produce a person.   

Don Marquis and the natural capacities theorists attempt to meet this burden; but religious, faith-based reasons aside, most pro-choicers remain unpersuaded.  From a purely secular, naturalistic viewpoint, pro-choice appears comfortably secure.  Indeed, for many years this analysis reflected my own mindset on the matter. Unfortunately, abortion is not some arcane point of scholarly dispute:  people are literally being murdered over this issue.  Elections and Supreme Court appointments are at stake.  Rancor and passion often rule public discussions of the abortion issue.



I will call the following pro-choice argument the “Pure Potentiality Argument.”
1.	Suppose, right now – in today’s socio-cultural context - a cloning machine existed that could, over 9 months, gradually grow healthy full-fledged human beings from human finger cells. 
2.	If such technology existed every normal finger cell selected for cloning, and subsequently placed in the machine’s chamber, would be a potential (full-fledged) person (either prior to or coinciding with the commencement of the cloning process).
3.	Even so, it would not be immoral to frivolously stick a needle in my finger and thereby kill several such pre-selected potential persons, even if these cells would have been otherwise been cloned into full-fledged persons.  
4.	Nor would it be morally significant, taken as a morally unconditional act, to intentionally kill a finger cell one second after placing the cell in the chamber after the process has begun.  Nothing magical or morally significant happens in that short a time when the cell is moved a few inches from outside to inside the operating chamber.
5.	On the other hand, full-fledged human persons have a morally significant intrinsic value.  Frivolously and intentionally killing a person is murder and immoral.  
6.	Therefore, compared to genuine personhood, in and of itself, mere potential personhood is not morally significant – it has no prima facie moral value. 


Premise (4) mentions a “morally unconditional act.”  I assume the following definitions:

A morally unconditional act is not subject to any special prior obligation or concern other than community-wide obligations or concerns that apply to everyone equally. 

Within the current broad, community-wide, socio-cultural context of an agent, a prima facie wrong is an act that by default morally ought not be done, even as a morally unconditional act, unless for the sake of some greater good. For example, murder, cheating, and torture are prima facie wrongs.

I shall also call prima facie wrongs “intrinsic” wrongs.  

Something has intrinsic moral value in my sense when it is prima facie wrong to intentionally destroy it.  

I do not mean that something has intrinsic value devoid of socio-cultural context or impact on the welfare of the general community.​[6]​  A primary aim in the abortion debate is determining whether abortion should be counted as a prima facie wrong.  Supposing an act to be morally unconditional strips away all possible secondary obligations or concerns in order to consider whether the act is an intrinsic wrong.  For example, in premise (4) above I want to eliminate the possibility that I promised a friend never to kill a cell once in the chamber.  In that case, moving the cell from outside to inside the chamber would make a moral difference, but it would not establish killing the chamber cell to be a prima facie wrong.  The wrongness of killing the cell would be conditional upon a prior special obligation.​[7]​  Cheating is a prima facie wrong regardless of any secondary obligations or third party concerns, i.e., even if done as a purely morally unconditional act.

In my view, the Pure Potentiality Argument is a good argument – it is sound.  I realize a number of pro-lifers would dispute the truth of premises (3) and (4).  For example, Don Marquis​[8]​ would view premise (4) as question-begging.  On his view, moving the cell into the chamber would start a process that may well result in a person with a happy life and a valuable future.  According to Marquis, at any stage in life, depriving a being of a valuable future is harmful and morally significant.​[9]​  He would likely deny that any finger cell is a potential person or a thing with a valuable future (3).  And Marquis would likely say there is a morally significant difference between being inside or outside the chamber.  Natural capacities theorists would also object to premise (3).​[10]​ My response to these objections would be to offer a comprehensive view of the morality of killing – including plants and insects - that makes sense of the truth of (4).  I would then compare the comprehensive cohesiveness, ramifications, and explanatory power of my theory versus that of Marquis’s.  Only this kind of response would avoid the charge of question-begging.  But my target audience for this paper are pro-choicers who accept the soundness of the Pure Potentiality Argument and the truth of (4).  My audience shares my fundamental convictions over the morality of killing.  Therefore, it is unnecessary to go through any detailed defense of the argument.

The first premise’s qualification that we are speaking “right now – in today’s socio-cultural context” is important.  For example, suppose a disaster wiped out all but a few humans.  Suppose both the survivors and the species depended upon an effort to rapidly repopulate.  In that context survivors arguably have a strong moral obligation to procreate and to not abort a healthy fetus.  Suppose we did have a cloning machine, but it took a great deal of time and precious resources to prepare and grow a finger cell into a person; i.e., the machine’s use is limited.  Here, it may indeed be morally significant whether the cell is outside or inside the operating chamber – aborting the process may result in significant loss.  In such exigent circumstances, the cell’s potential personhood may be morally significant.  Perhaps in this socio-cultural context one should reasonably view premise (4) as false.  But this result is consistent with the basic conclusion that mere potential personhood per se is not morally relevant.  Potential personhood can acquire an extrinsic value because of the web of circumstances – much like cases in which a normally worthless pebble may be extremely valuable.  However, a central point of this paper will be that a human conceptus does ordinarily have significant intrinsic moral value.

The Pure Potentiality Argument alone does not justify a secular pro-choice case in today’s socio-cultural context.  For that, an additional premise is necessary:

The Relevant Difference Premise:  Religious considerations aside and all other things equal, in today’s socio-cultural context and as a morally unconditional act, there is no morally relevant difference between intentionally killing a conceptus and intentionally killing a finger cell at the beginning of the cloning process.

The Relevant Difference Premise together with the truth of conclusion (5) and premise (3) imply that in today’s context, abortion at the conceptus stage is not a prima facie wrong.  If intentionally killing a finger cell with potential personhood is not a prima facie wrong, and there is no morally relevant difference between that and killing a viable conceptus, then intentionally aborting a conceptus is not a prima facie wrong.

In what follows I will argue there is good reason to reject the Relevant Difference Premise.  I will propose a general view of intrinsic value covering a whole range of attributions, including the intrinsic value of a human person and a human conceptus.  There are a number of independent reasons to accept this general account of value.  And if it applies, the burden of proof is shifted to the pro-choicer to explain why the conceptus should not be assigned a meaningful value.

In the following discussion there will be much supposition about what “we” value, especially concerning various masterpieces such the Mona Lisa, and Frank Lloyd Wright houses.  These specific examples are meant as plausible illustrations of a more general point.  It does not matter too much if the reader personally does not think highly of the Mona Lisa or Frank Lloyd Wright.  Any other masterpiece will serve to make my case:  Bach’s Mass in B Minor, Einstein’s theory of relativity, Joplin’s Me and Bobby McGee, etc. The case can be adjusted accordingly.  It is only important that “we” can agree that the relevant reasoning applies to some such case.

The Value of Masterpieces

There is a significant difference between killing a finger cell and killing a conceptus.  To make this case, I will argue that in many key respects a person has a value analogous to an artistic masterpiece, which in turn confers value to a conceptus – a value not shared by the finger cell.  This is a very complex analogy that will be developed in several stages.

Suppose we discovered that Leonardo da Vinci had a well-kept secret:  Somehow he had managed to get hold of sophisticated computer technology to assist him in his painting.  Leonardo composed the Mona Lisa on a powerful graphics program to create a painting file.  But Leonardo also had a painting device that read the Mona Lisa file and created the actual painting.​[11]​  He was truly a master of this technology; every texture, color, and nuance of the final product was intentional and planned.  No ordinary artist could achieve the Leonardo’s results using the same technology (just as sophisticated word processing software cannot make a great novelist).  We shall suppose that these devices were purely labor-saving, and in no way detracted from the genius of his work. We are also able to determine that Leonardo had no capability to make copies of the original file, and that original was always destroyed when implemented by the painting machine.  The famous painting in the Louvre is the only implementation of the file to ever exist. Even after this discovery, we still regard the Mona Lisa a true work of genius and a unique masterpiece.  

What was the value of the sole copy of the Mona Lisa file just after completion but before the creation of the actual painting?  Suppose Leonardo died and the file were destroyed before the creation of the painting.  Would such loss have moral significance?  Would intentional destruction of the file before implementation, in full knowledge of what it was, be a prima facie wrong?  What if Leonardo himself destroyed the file; would it still be a prima facie wrong?  I propose that consideration of these questions shed light on the abortion debate.  Destroying a conceptus in many key aspects is analogous to destroying the Mona Lisa file.

Before considering the value of the Mona Lisa file, we need to consider the value of the Mona Lisa itself.  The value of the painting is, to say the least, multidimensional.  It certainly has a great deal of commercial value, for a variety of overlapping reasons:  historical, art market, prestige, aesthetic value, rarity, universal recognizability, etc.  But a solid core of intrinsic cultural and human value underlies its vast commercial value.  It is a subtle, complex masterpiece that rewards the intellect and repeated viewing.  The Mona Lisa is one of those works that opens our eyes to the vastness of human potential.  A true masterpiece of this class has the capacity to transform our understanding of what it means to be human. It is also worth noting that the Mona Lisa was valued from the beginning, in Leonardo’s own lifetime.  Its illustrious history begins with its sale to French King Francois I.  While its role in history has certainly enhanced its intrinsic value, it began its existence with a high degree of intrinsic worth.   I am not suggesting that the painting has intrinsic value devoid of any human context.  Rather, it has intrinsic value because of its wide-ranging, cross-cultural value to humanity as a whole versus its value to particular individuals in limited contexts.  If the painting were destroyed, it would be a loss to humanity regardless of the opinion of any individual or minority.  Or so I will assume for the purpose of this discussion.  Hence I am assuming that the Mona Lisa’s intrinsic value has a distinct moral dimension – it is a prima facie wrong to knowingly and intentionally destroy it apart from any financial consequences.​[12]​  In fact we would not consider it absurd for a person to knowingly sacrifice her life to save the painting. 

What value then should be assigned to the one and only Mona Lisa file prior to actual implementation?  Its value would have been substantial.  As described, the file itself incorporates virtually all the complex, subtle information found in, and expressed by, the painting itself.  Leonardo’s genius is already extant in the file.  However, it is the transformation of the file into the painting that permits the file’s information to be useful and valuable.  If Leonardo were dead, and we were certain that the file’s encryption would never permit implementation, then the file would be virtually worthless.  It would be worthless despite the complex information and genius incorporated in it.  Hence the value of the file is fundamentally derivative upon the value it would have as an implemented painting.  Its value, then, is a function of both the value of the information and the ease of practical accessibility and implementation.  Moreover, in this case, we are supposing that the file is the one and only way to access and implement the information.  I propose that on a scale measuring ease of public access and implementation, the closer the file is to the end product, the painting, the more its value approaches the value of the painting itself:

The Accessibility Principle:  the more accessible a potential X is to a full-fledged X, all other things equal, the more the value of a potential X approaches the value of a 
full-fledged X.

I will speak of “the accessibility scale” based upon both the ease and cost of actualizing something’s potentiality as well as the probability of success.  For example, suppose we had a safe, effective way of storing and transporting the Mona Lisa by quickly and easily transforming the painting into a small stable cube and later easily reversing the process.  The value of that cube would be virtually identical to the value of the painting itself.  For example, insurance companies would likely pay just as much for the loss of the cube as for the painting itself.  Whereas, if the implementation of the Mona Lisa file requires time, expense, and a complicated, fragile piece of machinery, the distance to implementation would be much greater, and the value of the file would be substantially less than the actual painting.  One would expect an insurance company to pay less – even for a one and only original file.  Nevertheless, the file would have substantial intrinsic value on the grounds of its capacity or potential to be practically implemented.  Imagine the excitement if someone today discovered a cache of yet unimplemented Leonardo painting files.  Regardless of their commercial value, we would regard the intentional destruction of the files as a great loss and a prima facie wrong.  In some cases, as will be discussed later on, it is more relevant to speak of ease of access and implementation in personal rather than public terms.  

It is possible for two people to reasonably differ in both attitude and estimation of the accessibility scale.  That may result in differing intrinsic value assignments.  For example, if the very process of implementing a seed is highly desirable and enjoyable, as may be the case in the production of art, the negative impact of time and cost may be discounted in one’s accessibility assessment.  That in turn may influence even a public, third party assessment of accessibility and the intrinsic wrong of destroying a seed.

I am not claiming that the file has mere potential value; rather, it has actual value because of its potential.  If the file were irretrievably encrypted, both file and information would have little or no value.  So in claiming that the file has “intrinsic” value, I am not claiming that we value it “for its own sake”  - though that is a common use of ‘intrinsic.’  My test for determining “intrinsic value” in a given context is to ask if it would be prima facie wrong to destroy the file.  Would it be wrong to destroy it purely as a whim, even as a morally unconditional act?  If so, that would entail the existence of a general obligation, and establish some degree of moral value that is not dependent upon the particular desires and preferences of the agent.  

DNA and the Value of a Genome​[13]​

I am comparing the conceptus to the Mona Lisa file, and the Mona Lisa itself to the person the conceptus has the potential to become.  If the analogy holds, then in appropriate circumstances we should expect the high value we assign personhood to confer substantial intrinsic value on a conceptus with a potential to become a person.  But for the analogy to work, the conceptus must already contain at least a good part of the complex information that justifies assigning a high intrinsic value to the eventual person.   At this point I would like to introduce the notion of being a “seed” for the mature individual or thing that we intrinsically value.  In my quasi-technical sense:

A seed is (a) any physical vehicle that has the function (natural or intentional) of bearing information and/or instructions necessary to create an individual or thing that we do intrinsically value.  Furthermore (b) we intrinsically value the end product of the seed as an expression of the information encoded in the seed.  (Normally the physical vehicle itself will have no intrinsic value except as a carrier of the relevant information.)  And (c) to be a seed, the practical means must exist to implement seed to a finished result.

Clause (b) above is important.  For example, suppose the Mona Lisa came from a generic painting file, and the final end product was not part of any detailed intentional plan.  Rather, there were quantum elements in the program implementing the file that generated substantially different content each time the program was run: on one occasion, by pure astronomical chance, the file implementation produced the Mona Lisa, yet on the vast majority of occasions it produces worthless paintings.   In this case the file would not count as a “seed” in my sense. The traits that we value in the Mona Lisa would not be mappable to the information encoded in the file.  The file only becomes valuable as a bearer of the complex information that eventually makes the painting valuable as an expression of that information.​[14]​  

I will also refer to the “performance” of the seed:

A performance is any actual expression of a seed that we intrinsically value due to and because of the information in the seed.  The information uniquely contained in the seed must be a primary source of the performance’s intrinsic value.  

For example, a particular viewing of the movie Casablanca is the performance of a particular reel of film.  The reel of film is a seed that is only valuable as the bearer of the complex information that makes viewing the movie so interesting.  In the case of Casablanca, the seed reel is not particularly valuable because there are many other copies.  Destroying any particular seed does not destroy the essential information, or substantially hinder our ability to access that information for future performances.  In contrast, the one and only Mona Lisa file prior to any performance of the file is extremely valuable precisely because destruction of the seed would entail destruction of the information, and preclude any possibility of a future performance.  The physical painting is the performance of the seed.  Also, I do not mean to imply that the total intrinsic value of a performance can be explained in terms of the information contained in the seed.  I only claim that a substantial part of the performance’s value must be traceable to the seed.  A performance “confers” value on a seed because it is the means of accessing the seed’s information and making it useful.  Without the means (or potential means) of producing a performance, the seed’s information has no value.

My analogy to abortion only works if the genius of the Mona Lisa is already incorporated in the file, which then would count as a seed.  We must be able to find some comparable genius in the seed of a person.  The DNA of a conceptus sustains this part of the analogy.
From earlier still, the DNA of all mammals must describe aspects of very ancient environments as well as more recent ones.  The DNA of a camel was once in the sea, but it hasn’t been there for a good 300 million years.  It has spent most of recent geological history in deserts, programming bodies to withstand dust and conserve water.  Like sandbluffs carved in fantastic shapes by the desert winds, like rocks shaped by ocean waves, camel DNA has been sculpted by survival in ancient deserts, and even more ancient seas, to yield modern camels. 
... in this indirect sense ... [human] DNA is a coded description of the worlds in which our ancestors survived.  An isn’t it an arresting thought?  We are digital archives of the African Pliocene, even of Devonian seas; walking repositories of wisdom out of the old days.  You could spend a lifetime reading in this ancient library and die unsated by the wonder of it. 

Richard Dawkins, Unweaving the Rainbow (1998)

How long did it take Johann Sebastian Bach to create the St. Matthew Passion? ... How long did it take to create the Christianity without which the St Matthew Passion would have been literally inconceivable by Bach or anyone else?  Roughly two millennia.  How long did it take to create the social and cultural context in which Christianity could be born?  Somewhere between a hundred millennia and three million... . And how long did it take to create Homo sapiens?  Between three and four billion years ... .  Billions of years of irreplaceable design work.  .... We correctly intuit a kinship between the finest productions of art and science and the glories of the bioshpere.

Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995)

In the selections above Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett, well-known atheists, regard the sheer, awe-inspiring wonder of a species’ DNA (that is primarily what Dennett is talking about when he refers to the “billions of years of irreplaceable design work”).   In terms of complexity, clever ingenuity, and profound meaning, Dawkins and Dennett would value human DNA at least as much as (and probably more than) any human masterpiece or work of genius.  Indeed, their descriptions of this essence of humanity have the quality of religious awe – an analogy they might well accept.   But it is not simply the humanness of the DNA that plays any crucial role in the value being assigned here. Rather, it is the wondrous, complex nature of the information and function of the DNA that is being extolled, e.g., camel DNA and other “glories of the biosphere.”  Dennett points out that killing a condor is worse than killing an individual cow because condors are on the verge of extinction.  Killing a condor threatens “our actual store of design,” whereas killing a single cow does not.​[15]​  The information, as well as any other actual or potential value attached to condors, may be forever lost.

The Valuing of Species

The performance of a genome’s DNA is both an organism and a species.  But does it make sense to value a species as a masterpiece?  What does such valuation mean and imply?  I make the following general assumptions about a masterpiece such as the Mona Lisa or Bach’s Mass in B minor:

1.	A masterpiece has substantial aesthetic and intellectual value.  It exhibits a complexity and richness that rewards repeated study, analysis, and understanding.  I mean to regard works such as Einstein’s theory of relativity as a masterpiece.

2.	Masterpieces have a substantial value to the public (or humanity), and not merely a particular group of individuals.  

3.	A masterpiece like Hamlet can have a substantial value to a person, or a class of persons, even if they are completely unaware of its existence. Even if such items were lost and no one currently knew of their existence, we (the public) would regard their destruction as tragic.  We strongly desire to avoid inadvertent destruction of unknown or lost masterpieces.

The value attached to species is multidimensional: aesthetic, intellectual, moral, spiritual, pragmatic, and economic. Here I am speaking of living organisms – not pieces of DNA. There are strong arguments, not just for the protection of particular classes of species, but for respecting biodiversity in general.​[16]​  A variety of plants, animals, and microbes have yielded tremendous, previously unforeseeable gains in science and health.  It is impossible to say what valuable knowledge will be lost if the South American rainforest were destroyed tomorrow, but few knowledgeable people doubt the loss would be great.

I think it is clear that many people consider species masterpieces according to the above criteria. There is a religious and secular history for valuing the “wonders of creation” or nature.  The Endangered Species Act is predicated on a high public regard for the diversity of biological life.   Some Jainist monks are not permitted to eat or drink between sunset and sunrise lest in the darkness they inadvertently eat an insect.  Every organism of a species exhibits the aesthetic value and/or intellectual complexity requisite for a “masterpiece of design”.  Indeed this designation applies not just to the organism as an individual, but to its parts and biological systems such as eyes and immune systems.  It also applies to life-cycles and places in ecosystems.  The operation of the simplest life-forms such as viruses and fungi inspire awe and wonder in most who take the time to study them.

The relation between Hamlet and copies or staged productions of the play is a good analogy to explain the value we attach to both the species tiger and the genetic code for tiger. In fact one cannot meaningfully divorce a tiger from its genetic code.  Suppose on another world we discovered an animal that looks and acts like a tiger, but has completely different and unrelated genetics from earth tigers.  We would probably regard the creature as a pseudo-tiger and not genuine.  What makes the species tiger unique and intrinsically valuable is embodied in its genetic code.  The intrinsic value we attach to the species confers value on its genetic code.  For example, suppose all tigers were destroyed by a virus, but we have the genetic code from which we can bring the species back into living existence.  The loss of all the tigers would be tragic; but the loss of both the tigers and the functional genetic code would be much worse.  If so, the functional genetic code has significant intrinsic value.  Similarly, if all copies or productions of Hamlet were eliminated, that would be tragic.  But if, in addition, all knowledge or memory pertaining to the play were irretrievably lost, that would be much worse. Ultimately both Hamlet and the genetic code are information.
  
Of course, valuing the species or its genetic code is not the same as valuing every member of the species.  For example, destroying the species cow would be tragic, but humanely destroying an individual cow for food is generally considered not serious.  As far as humans are concerned, individual cows are generally considered fungible and not intrinsically extremely valuable.  But note that we do assign some degree of intrinsic value to an individual cow.  Humanely destroying a cow for food is one thing; destroying one for the sheer fun of it is, without a doubt, a prima facie wrong.  This would be true even in a large herd of genetically identical cows.  However, whatever intrinsic value we confer on an individual cow, the value assigned to a cow conceptus will be less given the accessibility distance discussed earlier.

Valuing the species in relation to its genetic code is not like valuing the one and only Mona Lisa and its one and only file.  A better analogy to valuing species would be valuing thousands upon thousands of identical (or closely-related) paintings implemented from thousands upon thousands identical (or closely-related) copies of the file. 

The Value of an Individual

"What a piece of work is a man! How noble
in reason! how infinite in faculty! . . . in apprehension how like a 
god!"  Hamlet

"And God created man in His own image”  Genesis 1:27

Thus far I have argued that the information embodied in the DNA of a conceptus has significant intrinsic value in terms of the performance of the species Homo sapiens.   The value of species confers value on the existence of its many seeds – not any particular seed.  But why assign any significant value to an individual human or conceptus? I have argued that the cases of valuing masterpieces and cows are properly subsumed under a more general account of value.  The value of the individual or species confers value on seeds depending on the accessibility distance between seed and performance.  I will argue that if we highly value both human individuals and species, under the general account we should value a human seed within a practical accessibility distance.  The burden of proof should properly be on the pro-choicer to show that a conceptus has no significant intrinsic moral value, regardless of its degree of personhood.

From a moral and spiritual perspective we assign immense intrinsic value to every full-fledged person.  At the very least, morality demands that we value others the way that we expect others to value ourselves.  Since we generally assign a great deal of intrinsic value to ourselves and expect others to value us accordingly, all other things equal, morality requires that we accord others the same degree of respect.  We are taught to respect each individual’s particular talents and capacities.  It is a common, age-old theme of both eastern and western spiritual traditions that we should view every individual as something like a masterpiece.  The idea that man is created in the image of God is usually interpreted to mean that each individual possesses God-like attributes.  Even though I am a secular humanist, I share this general perspective of the intrinsic worth of each human being.  We value each child according to their potential for being a credit to themselves and the community – not according to what actually happens.  We reasonably presume that children who are not bright in an academic sense have talents and capacities that can develop into an overall worthwhile life.  It is also worth noting that in  many cases one knows that some family would adopt and love a child, even if the birth mother is not in a position to accept the responsibility.  In these cases, this does add another moral dimension to the decision to abort.  

It is only important to my thesis that we assign an extremely high degree of intrinsic worth to an individual: the death of a person should be considered a tragic loss that, all other things equal, should be avoided.  It is not essential that we regard an individual as an artistic masterpiece per se.  But many of the more spiritually inclined of us – even the secular ones -would so regard any full-fledged person.  The three conditions for being a masterpiece described above arguably apply to every human being.

The Value of the Conceptus

The next step is to tie together the value of species, individual, genome, and conceptus.  Begin with the fact that we do assign a high degree of intrinsic value to an individual human.  Compare this to the case of the cow or flower in which the individual has no or relatively little intrinsic value while the species has high value.  But the value of a species is clearly related to the value of individual members of the species.  We do intrinsically value an individual human more than an individual cow, which in turn we value more than an individual tulip.  Likewise we value the species Bos taurus (common cow), more than Tulipa darwin (the “Queen of Night “ tulip).  Cows have some degree of personhood, experience pain and suffering, and have rudimentary rights; tulips do not.  Quite independently of our carnivorous bias, most of us would judge the total destruction of cows to be more tragic than the loss of Tulipa darwin.  Precisely because we intrinsically value the members of species X more than the members of species Y, we intrinsically value species X more than Y.  This means that if the encoded genetic information makes an individual cow valuable, it also makes the species valuable.  But the information in the genome is responsible for making the individual cow intrinsically valuable. Whatever degree of personhood an adult cow has is in effect due to the individual performance of the information embedded in that cow’s original conceptus.  However, we kill and eat cows for dinner; so their individual intrinsic value is not terribly high, and that of a bovine conceptus even less.
Compared to all other animal conceptuses, the value of a human conceptus is unique because of the extremely high value we place both on individual humans and Homo sapiens. Presumably the value we place on the human species is higher than that of cows because (among other things) we value individual humans more than cows.  Is the human conceptus a “seed” in my technical sense?  If so, under the general account of intrinsic value that I have been developing, a human seed or conceptus growing in woman’s womb in the course of a normal pregnancy ought to have significant intrinsic value.  
The Conceptus is a Seed

Suppose that we discovered a frozen viable conceptus of Albert Einstein’s identical twin to be.  What kind of information would we presume to be encoded in the conceptus?  It could be, of course, that Einstein’s prodigious intellect was the result of some extrinsic environmental factor – a stray cosmic ray hitting the fetus at just the right place and moment, or a chemical ingested by the mother.  But let us make the reasonable assumption that Einstein’s basic physical looks, potential life-span, temperament, intellectual capacity, and personhood capacity was encoded in the DNA of his conceptus.  We will assume the very same information is encoded in the recently discovered twin conceptus.

Intuitively, most of us would assign a high value to Einstein’s conceptus even apart from any possible financial gain or pleasure to be associated with Einstein’s person, name, or estate.  Einstein’s wit, temperament, and intellect were of a very high order.  All other things equal, most of us would consider it a privilege to be associated with any person of that sort.  That type of person is generally a credit to any community.  Even apart from his contributions to science, a good deal of what we value in Einstein is encoded in his genome.  The potential for genius is presumably encoded in the twin conceptus.  Raised in the proper environment, there is a reasonable chance that this genius could be fruitfully developed to one end or another.  Just knowing the general potential encoded in the anonymous twin conceptus would more than likely fetch a high price in the in vitro fertilization market.  Nor would such high monetary value be irrational.  Even as a morally unconditional act, with no one the wiser, it would be prima facie wrong to destroy the twin conceptus.  If so, the conceptus counts as a “seed” and has significant intrinsic value.

The point here is not to suggest that pure reason forces us to interpret basic empirical facts in this way.  No doubt a logically coherent view could be developed that assigns Albert Einstein a high degree of intrinsic value and Hitler, from conceptus to adult, the status of worthless scum.  Rather, the point is, for the most part, pro-choicers and pro-lifers have a shared moral and spiritual perspective that can and should make sense of assigning a significant degree of intrinsic value to a conceptus – even from a naturalistic, non-dogmatic point of view.

I am not claiming that the full intrinsic value of the mature Albert Einstein – discoverer of the theory of relativity – was somehow encoded in the conceptus.  If that same conceptus were developed in a hundred different socio-economic circumstances, probably not another result would be as valuable as the real Einstein.  I am only claiming that a good deal of who Einstein was and what made him so valuable was encoded in that conceptus.  But that is Einstein.  What about conceptuses of average people?  Are they also intrinsically valuable?  Moreover, for every Einstein there seems to be a Hitler.

To address these issues, I would like to compare a human person to a masterpiece of architecture like some of the great works of Frank Lloyd Wright.​[17]​  For example, consider Wright’s brilliant house called Fallingwater perched over a river in Pennsylvania.  The house itself is much more than the information contained in its plans – which mostly describe the physical properties of the layout and structure.  One cannot extrapolate the complete genius of the marriage between structure and environment from the plans alone.  Yet one can look at the plans alone and see innovation and brilliance. The full intrinsic value of Fallingwater is not captured in the plans, yet the physical plans are clearly a seed in my sense of the term.  If there were one and only one copy of the unimplemented architectural plan for Fallingwater, we would judge it to have significant intrinsic value in the exact same sense we would assign the unimplemented Mona Lisa file intrinsic value.  The architectural seed would have significant intrinsic value despite the fact that Fallingwater could have been poorly built, with ugly materials and colors.  The house could have been used as headquarters of a global Nazi organization, and have gone down in history as a place whose name was effectively synonymous with insidious evil.  Yet those contingent accidents of history would not undermine the brilliance of the basic design.  Nor would such bad outcomes undermine the plans’ actual practical potential for being a resounding credit to the human community, as Fallingwater in fact is.  

I suggest that the DNA of a normal conceptus encodes something like the complex structure or basic architecture of the person the conceptus will grow to be in the normal course of human biological and cultural development.  Studies​[18]​ and other empirical observation indicate that this basic structure includes capacities for physical health, temperament, intellect, and other personality traits.  The complex capacity for full-fledged personhood is encoded in the DNA.  These capacities represent real value, not just potential value. Suppose a scientist develops a drug for herpes that fails.  In a fit of frustration the scientist destroys the drug, the formula, and all of the research.  What she does not know is that the drug is a permanent, practical cure for AIDS that would have been apparent if only tried for that purpose.  Even though the drug’s potential was unrealized and unrecognized, it was nevertheless quite valuable because of this potential.  It is the same with latent but unrealized potential in seeds.  So we should not measure the value of the information encoded in a conceptus by the value of what performance in fact does or does not happen.  We ought to measure its value in terms of practical accessibility to the latent but as yet unrealized potential.

It is often objected that valuing a conceptus on the grounds of potentiality is arbitrary:  why the conceptus and not the sperm-egg pair a moment prior to conception?  That pair has all of the information incorporated in the conceptus.  But the relevant moral question is not what value should we assign a particular sperm-egg pair after conception, knowing which sperm won out.  Rather, we should ask would more harm be done intentionally killing a conceptus after the fact of conception than intentionally killing that sperm-egg pair before the fact.  

Moralists and theologians place great weight upon the moment of conception, seeing it as the instant at which the soul comes into existence.  If, like me, you are unmoved by such talk, you still must regard a particular instant, nine months before your birth, as the most decisive event in your personal fortunes.  It is the moment at which your consciousness suddenly became trillions of times more foreseeable than it was a split second before.  To be sure, the embryonic you that came into existence still had plenty of hurdles to leap.  Most conceptuses end in early abortion before their mother even knew they were there, and we are all lucky not to have done so.  …  Nevertheless, the instant at which a particular spermatozoon penetrated a particular egg was, in your private hindsight, a moment of dizzying singularity.  It was then that the odds against your becoming a person dropped from astronomical to single figures.

Richard Dawkins, Unweaving the Rainbow, pp 1-2

As Dawkins points out in the passage above, the odds that any particular sperm will successfully fertilize an egg is astronomical.  Fertilization is itself an elaborate process in which a number of things can go wrong.  The point is the accessibility distance (if it is meaningful to even apply this concept), prior to conception, from that sperm-egg pair to successful mature person is enormous compared to the accessibility distance to the successful full-fledged person after conception.  There is a vast change in probability space.  Such a vast change justifies a huge difference in how we assign value to the pair rather than the conceptus.​[19]​  

In principle it is possible for a particular, selected sperm-egg combination to function as a seed and be accorded intrinsic value.  Suppose science has developed a method that can infallibly produce a mature human being from any selected normal sperm-egg pair.  Once the pair is selected and prepped, in that context it is effectively a seed.  But this very selection process and that technological, intentional context create the vast change in probability space necessary to make sense of there being a seed with an accessibility relation to some potential performance.  

The Problem with the Relevant Difference Premise and the Pure Potentiality Argument

We are now in a position to see what is wrong with the Relevant Difference Premise as applied to the Pure Potentiality Argument and abortion.  The Relevant Difference Premise essentially claims that there is no morally relevant difference between killing a finger cell qua potential person and killing a conceptus qua potential person.  But according to the view I am proposing, there is quite a difference.  A finger cell contains only one of over a million copies of the very same genetic information; a conceptus, on the other hand, is the sole unique blueprint that each individual is based on.  If Leonardo, prior to creating his painting, made over a million copies of the Mona Lisa file, no particular physical file would have any significant intrinsic value.  It is only in the case where destroying the seed destroys or threatens to destroy the valued information that the physical seed itself becomes valuable.  In that case the destruction of the seed eliminates any future expression of the unique genius, or uniquely valuable information, encoded in the seed.

In the case of identical twins, or triplets, there is more than one seed for the same information.  But that makes the existence of the information, and a future performance, viz., the survivor, still fragile.  Destroying one of the twin conceptuses threatens the existence of the information.  What is more, in the case of twins, environmental factors and other chance factors are never completely identical; the twins inevitably develop unique personalities, talents, and roles.  Thus we know that each conceptus encodes for potentially distinct, uniquely valuable individuals.  An analogy would be if Frank Lloyd Wright made only two identical copies of the plans for Fallingwater.  Suppose each plan would be implemented on a different river, in a uniquely different environment – the end result being two distinct masterpieces, valued for distinct reasons.  Each copy of the plan would therefore have a very high degree of intrinsic value for its potential to express a masterpiece, though not any particular performance.

Another argument that I used to find persuasive and offered in bioethics classes runs as follows:   Suppose we had a machine capable of turning any lump of coal into a valuable diamond over the course of several days.  Running the machine is resource-intensive and can only cost-effectively convert a few lumps of coal per year.   In that case every suitable lump of coal is a potential diamond.  But surely such lumps of coal are not intrinsically valuable.  For every such lump there are millions more.  Nor would destroying the lump be serious a few seconds after the coal was placed in the chamber and the process started.  The problem here is two-fold.  A lump of coal is not a seed in my technical sense of the term.  The diamond is not valuable primarily because of any particular complex information uniquely encoded in the coal.  The high-pressure process and laws of physics create the diamond more than any expression of complexly differentiated, encoded information.  Second, lumps of coal are fungible – one piece is as good as any other.  If one were inclined to regard coal as encoding valuable information, there are billions of readily available copies if any one piece is destroyed.  This is a relevant difference to the case of a uniquely distinct and valuable seed. 

The Pure Potentiality Argument does establish that mere potential personhood per se is not sufficient to value a conceptus.  But that conceptus uniquely encodes valuable information that would be lost if aborted.  Thus there is good reason to challenge the Relevant Difference Premise, and, as far as I see, no good reason to accept it.  At the very least the burden is on the pro-choicer to show why that premise ought to be accepted.

Abortion 

If we grant the significant intrinsic value of a conceptus, how does that affect the issue of abortion?  In short, my answer is that stance better explains and makes sense of our basic intuitions, as well as the acrimony surrounding the abortion issue.  While granting the value of a conceptus in terms of potential personhood necessitates respecting the life of the unborn, it does not necessitate or justify a legal ban on abortion. 

As an analogy, granting the high intrinsic value of masterworks such as the Mona Lisa, how should we view a law requiring all artists to complete, mostly on the artist’s own time and resources, any artwork deemed to have requisite masterwork potential (granting for the sake of argument that one can infallibly determine a project’s masterwork potential)?  Under the law, an artist could be fined or imprisoned for failing to complete a masterpiece, once begun.  Let us grant that it is reasonable for the State to protect artwork masterpieces with fines or imprisonment for their destruction, even by the artist herself.  Could the State reasonably justify such a law on the grounds that the work in progress had an intrinsic value approaching the value of the finished masterpiece, merely because, as a seed, the work-in-progress was a potential masterpiece?​[20]​  Could the State reasonably argue that in order to protect the proper deference and respect to actual masterpieces, we have to extend such respect to works-in-progress?  I do not think so.

The value of the seed or work-in-progress is a function not only of potential, but also accessibility to existing complex information.  Presumably, especially at the beginning, an artist’s work-in-progress does not even meet the standard of being a “seed” in my sense, since, unlike an acorn, an unfinished painting does not contain the requisite information to be “performed” or executed into a full-fledged performance.  But more importantly the accessibility distance, between day one of a masterpiece in progress and day 254 of its debut, is considerable to say the least.  Think of all the obstacles an artist has to overcome to complete a masterpiece:  the time, effort, cost, access to space and materials, health and psychological problems, acts of God, etc.  All of these considerations argue for assigning a minimal value to an initial work-in-progress, increasing significantly as the work nears completion.  In passing such a law the burden is on the State to establish a basis for assigning a value to the work sufficient to overcome the artist’s pre-existing liberty and property rights.  Even in the case where an artist develops a genuine masterpiece seed, we would be loathe to sanction state interference with the right of the artist to destroy his own work prior to making it public.​[21]​

The case of abortion has parallels, but also some notable differences. A major difference is that a conceptus is a seed in my sense, containing the requisite information to express a full-fledged performance.  All other things equal, that difference confers more status to a conceptus than to the first day stage of a painting.  But nevertheless, the accessibility distance, from a conceptus to a full-fledged, mature human being fulfilling its human potential, is enormous.  It typically takes years of dedicated commitment to meet this challenge.  Proceeding with pregnancy involves a huge commitment of time and resources, and many, many things can go wrong.  If the baby were unwanted, this commitment would be (and often is) perceived as a huge disruption in one’s life.  This very accessibility distance and the attendant uncertainties make the intrinsic value of a conceptus far less than that of a successful youth or adult.  (Just as the more accessibility distance and uncertainty we put between the Mona Lisa file and a successful implementation, the lower the intrinsic value of the seed file will be.)  On this view, whatever value we assign to a seed conceptus, killing it is not murder. Nevertheless, like a masterpiece, the intrinsic value of a successful youth or adult is so high that it is reasonable to assign significant value to the seed conceptus.  Even from a naturalistic perspective, there is good reason to respect the life growing in the womb, and to regard abortion of this seed as a prima facie wrong. This is especially true of a 12-week old fetus:  the odds are high of a successful pregnancy – the accessibility distance rapidly closing.  We should, all other things equal, regard a late abortion as a tragic loss of something valuable. But the fetus is not a person with rights to anything.  Like the case of a masterwork-in-progress, in our socio-cultural context, there is no secular, legal, or moral basis for forcing a person to continue pregnancy and bear a child.

In general terms my basic point is as follows: Many pro-choicers only recognize one scale of relevant moral value in their stance on abortion – degrees of personhood.  As such, they assign zero value and no rights to a conceptus or fetus.  Starting with the substantial value of the Mona Lisa, the logic of the conventional pro-choice stance would assign little or zero value to a unique seed file of the painting, on the grounds that it only represented a mere potentiality.  Yet I assume that, like myself, many of these pro-choicers would in fact assign a significant degree of intrinsic worth to the seeds of such masterpieces - it would be a prima facie wrong to knowingly destroy such seeds.  But if in reality these pro-choicers would find the decision to destroy a Mona Lisa seed “troubling” on the grounds of intrinsic worth, why do not the same basic considerations apply to the decision to destroy a fetus?  I contend that if one looks closely at the reasons most people would have for finding the decision to destroy a masterwork seed troubling, in many circumstances one can, for essentially analogous reasons, make sense of finding the decision to abort “troubling.” This entails imputing some sort of significant value to masterwork seeds or a fetus, even though it does not entail making abortion illegal.  The personhood-as-sole-criterion-for-moral-standing view cannot make sense of imputing any such public, intrinsic value to a conceptus.
It is also worth noting that on my view there is no reason in the case of humans to confine moral value to personhood.  For example, we value babies and children for many reasons other than their current capacity for personhood.  In addition to being cute, interesting, and just plain fun​[22]​, babies and children typically cement a relationship or marriage.  They often bring out the best in people, inspiring a sense of purpose and responsibility.  One supposes that the social fabric of society would be worse off without privately parenting children, but that, of course, is an empirical matter.  We deeply value our own kin and expect others to treat them with respect.  Morality requires we treat the children of others the same way.  Thus quite independent of personhood there are other reasons for according children intrinsic value.  These other sources of intrinsic value also count in assessing the value of a conceptus.  This means that we probably value children for different reasons than valuing adults.  If so, the curve measuring total intrinsic value will not be a simple straight line slanting up from conceptus to adult full-fledged person.  It may rapidly slant up to the point of birth and more or less plateau at a high degree of worth from birth to death.  This would considerably shorten the accessibility distance between conceptus and a performance of considerable intrinsic value.  The standard personhood view does not make sense of these other sources of intrinsic value with regard to abortion.​[23]​


Applications

Columnist David Brooks describes the wonders of the fetus this way:
In the beginning there is the womb and the creature inside. It is creating 2.5 million nerve cells in the brain every minute, and will have well over 100 billion by the time it is born. By the end of the third month, the fetus will have begun making steplike movements. Shortly thereafter its taste buds begin to work, and it can tell whether the amniotic fluid is sweet or garlicky, depending on what its mother had for lunch.

It is hearing and making sense of what it hears. …They can distinguish their own language from other languages. If their mothers read “The Cat in the Hat” to them over a period of weeks, they can remember the tonal patterns of that story and distinguish them from the patterns of some other story.  By this stage, the fetus has a personality. If it is unusually active now, it will probably be unusually active after birth. If it has trouble sleeping now, it will have the same trouble after birth. … If its mother is stressed, it will feel stress.  It has those traits all human beings share — a talent for orienting itself in space and for learning language. And it has traits distinct to itself. It already has a tendency to be introverted or extroverted, neurotic or calm, temperamentally happy or temperamentally morose. Nothing that happens later in life will fundamentally reverse these prenatal qualities.

“Postures in Public, Facts in the Womb,” David Brooks, New York Times 4/22/07

Brooks lambastes the pro-choice stance on late-term abortions (especially “partial-birth” abortions) and concludes:
If we could get this issue away from the abortion professionals and their orthodoxies, we could reach a sensible solution: abortion would be legal, with parental consent for minors, during the first four or five months, and illegal except in extremely rare circumstances afterward.

While Brooks’ legal stance on late-term abortions is debatable, I do recognize the issue is far more morally complicated than taking a morning after pill – and reasonable people (including secular humanists) can disagree.  The conceptus-as-seed view explains much about the feelings and attitudes surrounding an abortion.  In particular it explains how the moral status of the fetus rapidly appreciates, as the seed’s latent information – the mind-boggling wonder of evolution’s design – is expressed and implemented.  As more and more of da Vinci’s plan and design of his Mona Lisa became expressed and actualized on canvas, the more the substantial intrinsic moral value of the work-in-progress increased.  Mozart’s Requiem was and is a masterpiece despite the fact it was unfinished.  Instead of vaguely measuring the value of the fetus against some future abstract standard of sentience or personhood, on the proposed view, the value is located as existing in the seed – the conceptus – as much as in some future state.  Since we obviously do recognize and value the biological wonders locked in the conceptus’s genome, particularly as the basis for expressing a future human “masterpiece,” it is entirely appropriate for Brooks to appeal the biological wonder of fetal development in putting the intrinsic value of the developing seed in perspective.  The more we psychologically focus on the wonders of design and potential locked in the conceptus, thereby discounting the accessibility distance between seed and realization, the more we tend to view the value of the seed as approaching the realized potential. 

The conceptus-as-seed view explains why even pro-choice women rarely act as if the conceptus is no more than a few cells or another “part of a woman’s” body.  The zero-intrinsic-value view makes it quite difficult to explain what is truly going on when even pro-choice women experience a profound sense of loss, regret, or even guilt over an abortion.  Years later I have heard women talk about the child that was not to be: e.g., “The child would have been 12 by now;” or, “That baby would now be Johnny’s big brother or sister.”  Men do not often think this way, yet they would also be the parent of that aborted seed.  I had always taken such remarks to be an emotional expression of a lost opportunity to be a mother to another child.  I took the expressions to be more about the desire to be a mother than about mourning the loss of something that was a mere potential person, which had no intrinsic value per se.  But this view is shallow, if not outright sexist.   If I were somehow forced to destroy the Mona Lisa, I would, of course, experience deep loss and regret over the fact I (and the rest of humanity) would never again have the opportunity to view the painting.  But that sense of loss and regret would be profound precisely because I view the painting as so intrinsically valuable to begin with.  If a woman has never conceived to begin with, she may well express a deep regret over the missed opportunity of motherhood.  But it will be over no particular child or potential child.  And that would certainly be no rational occasion for experiencing guilt over a particular child that was not to be.  

I offer the following speculation.  Most women do not view pregnancy as unwelcome, or simply as a disruption to be dealt with.  On the contrary, it is a time of great joy.  (Indeed, many women intrinsically value the state of being pregnant.) The decision to abort is often painful because of the positive feeling she has about being pregnant.  In many such cases, if circumstances were otherwise, she would want to be pregnant and have the child.  As a result of these positive feelings about the whole process of pregnancy and bearing the child, they psychologically tend to discount the accessibility distance between conceptus (or fetus) and successful child.​[24]​  That, in effect, brings the mother’s assessment of the intrinsic value of the conceptus closer to the value of child that would be – especially when one considers the high intrinsic worth of a baby apart from personhood.  Even in cases in which a woman hated idea of being pregnant and had relatively little trouble with the decision, in the years that follow, her attitude about that pregnancy may change.  She may later discount the accessibility distance and attach a much higher value to that fetus.  For example, how one would value the Mona Lisa file would very much depend on one’s attitudes and beliefs about the difficultly of implementing the file. If one viewed the process as a huge resource-consuming hassle, that increases one’s estimation of the accessibility distance and lowers the estimation of the file’s value.  On the other hand, if one views the process as resource-consuming but joyful and worthwhile, that increases the estimation of the file’s value.  In other words, I am speculating that women and men may well have different grounds for assigning intrinsic value to the act of abortion.  Nevertheless, even though a man may assign less intrinsic value to a fetus than a woman, that is no reason to assign the fetus an insignificant public intrinsic value. 

Conclusion

I have argued that the intrinsic value of conceptus and potential person is just one instance of a more general value relationship between seed and potential, mature seed product.  In general, in these relationships the seed does not have the same degree of intrinsic value as the performance, but nevertheless may have significant value due to its accessible potential to engender the performance.  The fact that the general issues of the abortion debate parallel these other seed cases is evidence for the coherence and plausibility of my account.  
So the pro-lifers are right: the potential personhood of a conceptus is morally significant – not because of the potentiality per se, but because all of the unique circumstances encompassing a normal human pregnancy and birth – e.g., conceptuses are normally unique and not one of 1000 cloned copies.  No wonder pro-lifers are upset at pro-choicers who acknowledge the supreme value of a person while denying any significant value to the unique seed that will become that person.  They view abortion as a tragic loss, and blame pro-choicers for desensitizing society to the significance of this loss.  We ought to respect the life in the womb.  But it does not follow that one ought to assign the same degree of respect or moral standing to a fetus and baby. Perhaps with added faith-based additional premises the moral equivalence does follow.  However, there is no universal secular basis for assigning legal rights to a conceptus.  There is no secular basis for viewing abortion as homicide or murder.  The truth is somewhere between the two extremes.  That is the real source of acrimony.   Each side has good reason for much of their stance, and yet good reason to believe the other side wrong.  My view explains this result.  But it also holds out the promise that by shifting the grounds for debate, more respect for the other side will result in civility and political progress. 

Reed Richter, Ph.D.
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N. Bethesda, MD 20852
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^1	  My thanks to Don Marquis, Louise Anthony, Dan Hunter, Michael Ferejohn, and Chris Morris for their contributions to this paper.
^2	  A conceptus is a fertilized human ovum, a human zygote.  Testing any view of abortion on how it deals with a conceptus versus a later term fetus is useful for clarifying the issues.
^3	  Widely-respected versions of the anti-choice arguments have been defended by Don Marquis “Why abortion is immoral,” Journal of Philosophy 1989, 864: 183-202, and more recently by Dan Moller ,e.g., “Abortion and Moral Risk” (unpublished, 2007).  For a discussion of the natural capacities view of abortion, see P. Lee and R. George. "The Wrong of Abortion", in A. Cohen and C. Wellman, eds., 2005; and Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell: 13-26, at 20-21.
^4	  I have in mind the views of Mary Anne Warren and Michael Tooley.  These and many other pro-choicers make the possession of actual personhood the primary measure of the wrongness of killing.  It is generally a consequence of this view that mere potential persons have no significant moral standing or value.  I also recognize both Warren’s and Ronald Dworkin’s rejection of the “sentience only” criterion of moral status (See Dworkin’s Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom (1993); and Warren’s Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things (2000)).   In this, my view overlaps with theirs, I recognize diverse sources of intrinsic moral value that confer status on both conceptuses and newborns.  However, I suggest that my view and better developed and counts as more of an explanation as to why we should accept the potential humanity of a fetus as morally relevant.
^5	  It is fashionable these days to dismiss such thought experiments, particularly in the context of ethics, as “science fiction.” (A short review of this issue and references can be found in Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thought_experiments#Thought_experiments_in_philosophy.)  Indeed, some such philosophical science fiction is misused and obscures rather than clarifies certain issues.  But in the final analysis, as in physics, such stylized philosophical thought experiments, however improbable, can be and often are legitimate tools of the trade.  (In particular, see a rather good review of the issue in:  Sorensen, R.A., Thought Experiments, Oxford University Press, 1992.) The coherence and usefulness of particular thought experiments depend entirely on their use and context.  They are often tools used to frame issues rather than settle substantive claims.  Thus it is incumbent on the critic to show why a particular thought experiment is inappropriate or misleading.  Often, such criticism itself can elucidate an issue, making fruitful use of an unintentionally flawed thought experiment. 
^6	  I do not think it is very meaningful to ask, “All other things equal, which universe is better: one devoid of sentient life but having the Mona Lisa, or one devoid of sentient life with no Mona Lisa?”  However, if one has such a view of intrinsic value, my view of abortion can be readily accommodated.  
^7	  The determination of whether an act is prima facie wrong is made counterfactually:  One asks, “all other things equal, would my killing the cell in the chamber be wrong if it were a morally unconditional act?”
^8	  Marquis D. “Why abortion is immoral,” Journal of Philosophy 1989, 864: 183-202.  In private correspondence on this paper, Don Marquis did not object my characterization of his view.
^9	  Strictly speaking, on Marquis’s view, it is not potential personhood that confers moral standing to a fetus, rather it is “having a valuable future” that confers moral standing to both a fetus and a full-fledged person.  
^10	 See note 3 for references.
^11	  Such technology is not farfetched. There are devices on the market that will digitalize and physically reproduce an artwork with matching color and 3D surface textures.
^12	  It should be noted that there are a number of laws and international treaties protecting art as cultural heritage.  It is also illegal in the US to destroy or deface an artist’s work, even by the legal owner:  see the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990.  This law was based on earlier precedents such as Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, September 9, 1886.  These laws and treaties explicitly or implicitly recognize the intrinsic value of art, especially art considered cultural heritage such as the Mona Lisa.
^13	  A “genome” is the full set of chromosomes and genes that an individual inherits from their parents.  So the genome embodies the genetic information inherited from the parents.
^14	  I am not suggesting that the person appreciating the Mona Lisa has to know that it came from a seed of any sort, as opposed to being painted in a normal way.  I am only saying that, however the information was imparted to the painting, it is being appreciated for the qualities caused and expressed by that information.  
^15	 Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995) , p. 513
^16	  For a nice discussion of all these values see chapter 3 (pp. 43-71) of Perspectives on Biodiversity by the Committee of Noneconomic and Economic Value of Biodiversity, National Research Council (1999).  The material is posted on the web at:  http://books.nap.edu/books/030906581X/html/43.html
^17	  For examples, see http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/cas/fnart/fa267/FLW.html
^18	  See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twin_studies
^19	  Since most conceptuses fail, there is another (much smaller) significant probability leap from conceptus to fetus to person, perhaps the arguments of this paper should be more concerned with abortions of fetuses rather than conceptuses.   How we view the value of the conceptus would affect our stance on birth control methods like the IUD that often abort conceptuses.  My own view of the matter is that since nature aborts most conceptuses anyway, the accessibility distance between conceptus and successful child reasonably allows tolerating birth control as serving a greater good.  This revision does not affect the substance of any of my arguments. 
^20	  I am assuming that there are no special circumstances that otherwise affect the value we confer on art or masterpieces, e.g., all extant works of art have been destroyed in some catastrophe.
^21	  Though, the case for state inference for the right of continued existence for a finished seed, is significantly stronger than the case for an undeveloped work-in-progress.  
^22	  Yes, this all has to be balanced against the intrinsically irritating things about babies, e.g., severe sleep deprivation.
^23	  For example, Michael Tooley ("Abortion and Infanticide". Philosophy and Public Affairs 2:1 (Autumn 1972): 37-65, at 52-53. ) does not consider infanticide the moral equivalent of murder.  On my view, even if a baby is only technically a quasi-person, but with a high degree of intrinsic moral value from various sources, killing it would be the moral equivalent of murder.  
^24	  Psychological states are themselves part of the accessibility calculation.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